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Abstract. In separation logic program analyses, tractability is generally achieved
by restricting invariants to a finite abstract domain. As this domain cannot vary,
loss of information can cause failure even when verification is possible in the un-
derlying logic. In this paper, we propose a CEGAR-like method for detecting spu-
rious failures and avoiding them by refining the abstract domain. Our approach
is geared towards discovering existential properties, e.g. “list contains value x”.
To diagnose failures, we use abduction, a technique for inferring command pre-
conditions. Our method works backwards from an error, identifying necessary
information lost by abstraction, and refining the forward analysis to avoid the
error. We define domains for several classes of existential properties, and show
their effectiveness on case studies adapted from Redis, Azureus and FreeRTOS.
1 Introduction
Abstraction is often needed to automatically prove safety properties of programs, but
finding the right abstraction can be difficult. Techniques based on CEGAR (Counter-
Example-Guided Abstraction Refinement) [11,20] can automatically synthesise an ab-
straction that is sufficient for proving a given property. Particularly successful has been
the application of CEGAR to predicate abstraction [15], enabling automated verifica-
tion of a wide range of (primarily control-flow driven) safety properties [1,8,19].
Meanwhile, separation logic has emerged as a useful domain for verifying shape-
based safety properties [2,3,7,14,26]. Its success stems from its ability to composition-
ally represent heap operations. The domain of separation logic formulae is infinite, so
to ensure termination, program analyses abstract them by applying a function with a
finite codomain [13]. Although this approach has proved effective in practice, it does
not provide a means to recover from spurious errors caused by over-abstraction.
This paper proposes a method for automated tuning of abstractions in separation
logic analyses. Instead of a single abstraction, our method works with families of ab-
stractions parameterised by multisets, searching for a parameter that makes the analysis
succeed. Expanding the multiset refines the abstraction, i.e. makes it more precise.
Our method uses a forward analysis that computes a fixpoint using the current pa-
rameterised abstraction, and a backward analysis that refines this abstraction by ex-
panding the multiset parameter. To identify the cause of the error and propagate that
information backwards along the counter-examples, we use abduction, a technique for
calculating sufficient preconditions of program commands [7]. We use the difference in
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symbolic states generated during forward and backward analysis to select new elements
to add to the multiset.
Our approach focuses on existential properties, where we need to track some ele-
ments of a data structure more precisely than the others. For example, we define the
domain of “lists containing at least particular values” (where the multiset parameter
specifies the values). In general, our approach works well for similar existential prop-
erties, e.g. “lists containing a particular subsequence”. Existential properties arise e.g.
when verifying that key-value stores preserve values, or in structures that depend on
sentinel nodes.
Our approach is complementary to standard separation logic shape analyses. It adds
a new tool to the analysis toolbox, but it is not a general abstraction-refinement solution.
In particular, universal properties such as “all list nodes contain a particular value” are
not handled. This is a result of our analysis structure: when forward analysis fails, we
look for portions of the symbolic state sufficient to avoid the fault, and seek to protect
them from abstraction. This is intrinsically an existential process.
1.1 Related Work
As in Berdine et al. [4] we wish to automate the process of ‘tweaking’ shape abstrac-
tions. In [4], abstract counter-examples are passed to a SMT solver, which produces
concrete counter-example traces. These traces determine so-called doomed states, con-
ceptually the same as those singled out for refinement by our procedure. An advantage
of our approach is that we use information from the failed proof to inform the abstrac-
tion refinement step, rather than exhaustively trying possible refinements as in [4]. This
aside, the two approaches are largely complementary: [4] focuses on discovering shape
refinements, while our work focuses on data properties.
Our approach operates lazily, but in contrast to lazy abstraction [19], we do not re-
compute the abstract post operator each time we refine the abstraction. The intermediate
formulae we compute during backward analysis can be seen as interpolants [22], but
rather than taking these directly for refining the abstraction, we use them to select new
parameters which have the effect of refining the abstraction. Such automatic discovery
of parameters for parameterised domains is similar to Naik et al. [23], however, instead
of analyzing concrete tests, we analyze abstract counter-examples.
Our notion of an abstraction function is similar to widening [12]. However, refin-
ing the abstraction with the least upper bound (as Gulavani and Rajamani [17]) would
not converge due to the presence of recursive data structures. [9] gives a widening for
shape domains, but this widening does not account for data, nor explicitly track exis-
tential properties. Refinement with an interpolated widen [16], while similar to ours, is
also not applicable as we do not work in a complete lattice that is closed under Craig
interpolation. Shape analyses such as TVLA [24] have been adapted for abstraction re-
finement [5,21], however, we believe these approaches could not automatically handle
verification of existential properties such as those in §5.
The refinement process in our approach assumes a parameterised domain of sym-
bolic heaps which can be refined by augmenting the multiset of parameters. Compared
to predicate abstraction, where the abstract domain is constructed and refined automat-
ically, in our approach we first have to hand-craft a parameterised domain. In part this
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r = nil;
while (*) {
r = new Node(r,*);
}
x = *;
r = new Node(r,x);
while (*) {
r = new Node(r,*);
}
t = r; res = 0;
while(res==0 && t!=nil){
d = t->data;
if (d==x) res = 1;
t = t->next;
}
assert(res==1);
start
r=nill1
l2
r=new Node(r,*) assume(true)
assume(true)
assume(true)
r=new Node(r,*)
assume(true)
l6
l5
l4
l3
r=new Node(r,x)
x=*
assume(res==0 && t!=nil)
d=t->data
assume(t==nil || res!=0)
end
assert(res==1)
t=r; res=0
assume(d!=x)
l11
l12
l10
l9
l8
l7
t=t->next
res=1
assume(d==x)
l13
Fig. 1. Left: running example. Right: associated control-flow graph. Nodes where abstraction
occurs are shaded.
reflects the intrinsic complexity of shape properties compared to properties verifiable
by standard predicate abstraction.
Several authors have experimented with separation logic domains recording exis-
tential information about stored data, e.g. [25,10]. Some of these domains could be
formulated in our multiset-parametric approach, and vice versa. However, our work
differs in that we focus on automating the process of refining the abstraction.
2 Intuitive Description of Our Approach
We now illustrate how over-abstraction can cause traditional separation-logic analy-
ses to fail, and how our approach recovers from such failures. Our running example,
given in Figure 1, is a simple instance of the pattern where a value is inserted into an
pre-existing data-structure, the data-structure is further modified, and the program then
assumes the continued presence of the inserted value. Our code first constructs a linked
list of arbitrary length (we use ‘*’ for non-deterministic choice). It picks an arbitrary
value for x, and creates a node storing this value. It extends the list with arbitrarily more
nodes. Finally, it searches for the node storing x and faults if it is absent.
Suppose our abstract domain consists of the predicates emp, representing the empty
heap, node(x, y, d), representing a linked list node at address x with next pointer y and
data contents d, and list(x, y), representing a non-empty list segment of unrestricted
length starting at address x and ending with a pointer to y. Nodes and list segments are
related by the following recursive definition:
list(x, y) , node(x, y, d′) ∨ (node(x, n′, d′) ∗ list(n′, y))
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(Primed variables—x′, y′, etc.—indicate logical variables that are existentially quanti-
fied). A traditional analysis, e.g. [13], starts with the pre-condition emp and propagates
symbolic states over the control-flow graph (right of Fig. 1). Consider the execution of
the program that adds a single node in the first while loop (node l1) then adds x to the
list, skips the second loop, and then searches for x (node l8). Following the two list
insertions (node l5) we obtain symbolic state
node(r, r′, x) ∗ node(r′, nil, d′)
As is typical, assume the analysis applies the following abstraction step:
node(r, r′, x) ∗ node(r′, nil, d′)  list(r, nil)
That is, it forgets list length and data values once there are two nodes in the list. At the
head of the third while-loop (node l8) it unfolds list(r, nil) back to the single-node case,
yielding node(r, nil, x′). Since this state is too weak to show that x = x′, the path where
res is not set to 1 appears feasible, and the analysis cannot prove assert(res==1).
Our solution. The analysis has failed spuriously because it has abstracted away the
existence of the node containing x. We cannot remove abstraction entirely, and we
also cannot pick a tailored abstraction a priori, because the appropriate abstraction is
sensitive to the target program and the required safety property. Instead, we work with a
parameterised family of abstractions. Starting with the coarsest abstraction, we modify
its parameters based on spurious failures, automatically tailoring the abstraction to the
property we want to prove.
For our example, we augment the domain with a family of predicates list( , , {d}),
representing a list where at least one node holds the value d (this domain is defined in
§4). Upon failing to prove the program, our backwards analysis looks for extensions of
symbolic states that would satisfy assert(res==1), and so avoid failure. Techni-
cally, this is achieved by posing successive abduction queries along the counter-example
path. If an extension is found, then the difference between the formulae from forward
and backward analysis identifies the cause of the spurious failure. In our example, the
analysis infers that the failure was due to the abstraction of the node storing x. We refine
the abstraction so nodes containing x are rewritten to list( , , {x}), “remembering” the
existence of x. This suffices to prove the program correct.
3 Analysis Structure
Symbolic heaps. A symbolic heap ∆ is a formula of the form Π ∧ Σ where Π (the
pure part) and Σ (the spatial part) are defined by:
Π ::= true | false | e = e | e 6= e | p(e¯) | Π ∧ Π
Σ ::= emp | s(e¯) | Σ ∗ Σ
Here e ranges over (heap-independent) expressions (built over program and logical
variables), p(e¯) over pure predicates and s(e¯) over spatial predicates. Logical variables
are (implicitly) existentially quantified; the set of all such variables in ∆ is denoted by
EVars(∆). Σ1 ∗Σ2 holds if the state can be split into two parts with disjoint domains,
one satisfying Σ1 and the other Σ2. A disjunctive symbolic heap is obtained by com-
bining symbolic heaps (both the pure and spatial part) with disjunction. We identify a
disjunctive heap with the set of its disjuncts, and also denote such heaps with ∆. The
set of all consistent symbolic (resp. disjunctive) heaps is denoted by SH (resp. P(SH)).
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Abstract domain. Our abstract domain is the join-semilattice (P(SH)>,`,unionsq,>), where
P(SH)> , P(SH) ∪ {>}, the partial order is given by the entailment relation `, the
join unionsq is disjunction, and the top element, >, represents error.
We assume a sound theorem prover that can deal with entailments between symbolic
heaps, frame inference, and abduction queries (square brackets denote the computed
portion of the entailment):
– ∆1 ` ∆2 ∗ [∆F ] (frame inference): given ∆1 and ∆2, find the frame ∆F such that
∆1 ` ∆2 ∗ ∆F holds;
– ∆1 ∗ [∆A] ` ∆2 (abduction): given∆1 and∆2, find the ‘missing’ assumption∆A
such that ∆1 ∗ ∆A ` ∆2 holds.
Specifications and programs. We assume that each atomic command c ∈ Cmd is asso-
ciated with a specification {P} c {Q}, consisting of a precondition P and a postcondi-
tion Q in SH (in fact, our case studies use specifications expressed by using points-to
and (dis)equalities only). We define assume(e) , {true} {e} and assert(e) , {e} {e}.
Specifications are interpreted using standard partial correctness: {P} c {Q} holds iff
when executing c from a state satisfying P , c does not fault, and if it terminates then
the resulting state satisfies Q. As is standard in separation logic, we also assume speci-
fications are tight: c will not access any resources outside of the ones described in P .
We represent programs using a variant of intra-procedural control-flow graphs [19]
over the set of atomic commands Cmd. A CFG consists of a set of nodes N containing
distinguished starting and ending nodes start, end ∈ N, and functions, succ : N →
P(N) and cmd : N × N ⇀ Cmd, representing node successors and edge labels. All
nodes either have a single successor, or all outgoing edges are labelled with command
assume(e) for the condition e that must hold for that edge to be taken.
Forward and backward transfer. We define the abstract forward semantics of each
atomic command c by a function JcK : SH → P(SH)>. The function JcK, fusing to-
gether rearrangement (materialisation) and symbolic execution [24,2,13,7], is defined
using the frame rule, which allows any triple {P} c {Q} to be extended by an arbitrary
frame ∆F that is not modified by c:
JcK(∆) , {> if @∆F . ∆ ` P ∗ ∆F{Q ∗ ∆F | ∆ ` P ∗ ∆F } otherwise.
When there is no ∆F such that ∆ ` P ∗ ∆F , the current heap ∆ does not satisfy the
precondition P of the command, and so execution may result in an error. We assume
that the prover filters out inconsistent heaps. Lifting disjunctions to sets on the left-hand
side is justified by the disjunction rule of Hoare logic. We lift JcK to a forward transfer
function P(SH)> → P(SH)> by mapping > to > and a set of symbolic heaps to the
join of their JcK-images.
We use abduction to transfer symbolic heaps backwards: given a specification {P} c {Q}
and disjunctive symbolic heap∆, if∆A is such thatQ ∗∆A ` ∆ then {P ∗∆A} c {∆},
i.e., we can “push” ∆ backwards over c to obtain P ∗ ∆A as a pre-state. This gives rise
to a backward transfer function JcK← : P(SH)→ P(SH) defined by:JcK←(∆) , choose({P ∗ ∆A | Q ∗ ∆A ` ∆})
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The heuristic function choose(−) selects a ‘good’ abduction solution (there can be
many, e.g. a trivial one, false). For some fragments best solutions are possible: e.g.
the disjunctive points-to fragment with (dis)equalities [7], a variation of which we
use in our backward analysis. Along assume-edges we have Jassume(e)K←(∆) =
wp(assume(e), ∆) = ¬e ∨ ∆.
3.1 Forward Analysis, Abstraction Function, and Parametricity
Forward analysis attempts to compute an inductive invariant N→ P(SH)>. It gradually
weakens the strongest property by propagating symbolic heaps along CFG edges using
the forward transfer, and joining the obtained JcK-images at each CFG node. Since our
abstract domain is infinite, and transfer functions are not necessarily monotone, forward
propagation alone may not reach a fixpoint, or even converge towards one.
We call a pair (SH, abs) an analysis. To ensure termination, propagated symbolic
heaps are abstracted into a finite set, and the propagation process is made inflation-
ary.4 Abstraction is realised by a function abs : SH → CSH whose codomain is a fi-
nite subset CSH of SH. At each step, abs replaces the propagated symbolic heap with
a logically weaker one in CSH ∪ {>}. We require abs to be inflationary, i.e., that it
soundly over-approximates symbolic heaps with respect to `. Making the propagation
inflationary means that instead of computing the (least) fixed-point of the functional
Φ : (N→ P(SH)>)→ (N→ P(SH)>), we compute the inflationary fixed-point of the
functional X 7→ X ∪ Φ(X).
Definition 1 (analysis comparison). Let abs : SH → CSH and abs′ : SH → CSH′ be
abstraction functions. We say that abs′ refines abs, written abs  abs′, if CSH ⊆ CSH′
and for every ∆ ∈ SH, abs′(∆) ` abs(∆). We say that (SH, abs′) is more precise than
(SH, abs) if abs  abs′.
In §3.2 and §4 we introduce families of analyses whose abstraction functions are
parameterised by a multiset (such analyses are parametric in the sense of [23]). For any
such family (SH, absS)S∈M, whereM is some family of multisets and absS : SH →
CSHS , we require that if S ⊆ S′ then absS  absS′ .
3.2 Forward-Backward Abstraction Refinement Algorithm
We now define an intra-procedural version of our analysis formally (we believe it could
be made inter-procedural without difficulty – see §6). Let (SH, absS)S∈M be a family
of analyses parameterised by a multiset. Our method for abstraction refinement starts
with the analysis (SH, abs∅), and iteratively refines the abstraction by adding terms to
the multiset S. The goal is to eventually obtain S such that using the analysis (SH, absS)
we can compute a sufficient inductive invariant.
Forward analysis. Algorithm 1 shows a forward analysis from §3.1 extended with ab-
straction refinement. The algorithm computes a fixpoint by constructing an abstract
reachability tree (ART). An ART is a tree T = (T,E, t0) ∈ ART where T is the set of
nodes, E the set of edges and t0 the root node. We write ET to refer to the set of edges
4 A function f : (A,v)→ (A,v) is inflationary if for every a, we have a v f(a).
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1 S := ∅; t0 := (start, emp); k := 0; ET = ∅; T = ({t0}, ET , t0);
2 while nodes atT (k) 6= ∅ do
3 foreach t = (n,∆) ∈ nodes atT (k) do
4 foreach n′ ∈ succ(n) do
5 D′ := Jcmd(n, n′)K(∆);
6 if D′ = > then
7 Add (t, (n′,>)) to ET ;
8 k, S := Refine((n′,>), S);
9 Break to the outermost while-loop;
10 else
11 foreach ∆′ ∈ D do
12 ∆′abs := absS(∆
′);
13 if ∆′abs 6v invT (n′) then
14 Told := T ;
15 Add (t, (n′,∆′abs)) to ET ;
16 invT := invTold [n
′ 7→ invTold(n′) unionsq∆′abs];
17 k := k + 1;
Algorithm 1: Forward analysis with abstraction refinement.
associated with a particular ART T . Nodes in T are of the form (n,∆) ∈ N× SH and
represent the abstract states visited during the fixpoint computation. We use the follow-
ing functions to deal with the ART: parentT : T \ {t0} → T returning the unique
parent of a node, depthT : T → N0 returning the length of the path from t0 to t,
and nodes atT : N0 → P(T ) returning the set of all nodes at the given depth. For
T = (T,E, t0) and T ′ = (T ′, E′, t′0), we write T ⊆ T ′ to indicate that T is a subtree
of T ′, i.e., that T ⊆ T ′, and E ⊆ E′, and t0 = t′0. We write cmd(n, n′) to repre-
sent the command labelling the edge between nodes n and n′ and spec(n, n′) for the
corresponding specification.
The algorithm iteratively propagates J·K-images of previously-computed abstract
states along CFG edges, applies abstraction if the result is consistent, and joins each
newly computed state with the previously-computed states at the same node. We store
the invariant computed at each step using a map inv : ART→ (N→ P(SH)>), reflect-
ing the fact that the invariant at a control point can be recovered from the node labels of
the ART. If we have nodes at(k) = ∅ for the current depth k, then we have successfully
computed an inductive invariant without reaching an error.
Suppose at some point the transfer function returns >, i.e., the forward analysis
fails to prove a property (e.g., a pure assertion or a memory safety pre-condition of
a heap-manipulating command). This can happen due to either a true violation of the
property, or a spurious error caused by losing too much information somewhere along
the analysis. The algorithm then invokes Algorithm 2, Refine, to check for feasibility
of the error and, if it is spurious, to refine the abstraction.
Backward analysis. Algorithm 2, Refine, operates by backward analysis of abstract
counter-examples. Rather than using weakest preconditions as in CEGAR, Refine uses
abduction to propagate formulae backwards along an abstract counter-example and
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1 Refine(t> : T , S :M) : N0 ×M
2 begin
3 k := depth(t>)− 1;
4 tcurr := t
>; tprev := parent(t>);
5 {P} { } := spec(tprev.n, tcurr.n);
6 Solve tprev.∆ ∗ [∆A] ` P ∗ true;
7 ∆′prev := tprev.∆ ∗ ∆A;
8 pathfwd := tprev.∆; pathbwd := ∆
′
prev;
9 while k > 0 do
10 tcurr := tprev; tprev := parent(tcurr); ∆
′
curr := ∆
′
prev;
11 ∆′prev := Jcmd(tprev.n, tcurr.n)K←(∆′curr);
12 pathfwd := tcurr.∆ · pathfwd; pathbwd := ∆′curr · pathbwd;
13 if tprev.∆ ` ∆′prev then
14 S := S ∪ SelectSymbols(pathfwd, pathbwd);
15 Delete tcurr-subtree of T ;
16 return k − 1, S;
17 k := k − 1;
18 throw “error”;
Algorithm 2: Backward analysis of counter-example by abduction.
t0 : (start, emp)
t1 : (l1, r = nil)
t2 : (l2, r = nil)
t3 : (l1, node(r, nil, ))
t4 : (l3, node(r, nil, ))
t5 : (l4, node(r, nil, ))
t6 : (l5, list(r, nil))
t7 : (l7, list(r, nil))
t8 : (l8, list(r, nil) ∧ t = r ∧ res = 0)
t9 : (l9, list(r, nil) ∧ t = r ∧ res = 0)
t10 : (l10, node(r, nil, d
′) ∧ t = r ∧ res = 0 ∧ d = d′)
t11 : (l12, node(r, nil, d
′) ∧ t = r ∧ res = 0 ∧ d = d′ ∧ d 6= x)
t12 : (l8, node(r, nil, d
′) ∧ t = nil ∧ res = 0 ∧ d = d′ ∧ d 6= x)
t13 : (l13, node(r, nil, d
′) ∧ t = nil ∧ res = 0)
t14 : (end,>)
Fig. 2. Abstract counter-example for the running example (§2).
check its feasibility. Once a point in the path is found where forward analysis agrees
with the backward analysis, the mismatch between the symbolic heaps from forward
and backward analyses is used to update the multiset S that determines the abstraction.
Definition 2. An abstract counter-example is a sequence (n0, ∆0) . . . (nk, ∆k) with:
– n0 = start and for all 0 < i ≤ k, ni ∈ succ(ni−1);
– ∆0 = emp, for all 0 < i ≤ k, ∆i ∈ absS(Jcmd(ni−1, ni)K(∆i−1)) and ∆k = >.
Figure 2 shows the abstract counter-example for the error discussed in §2. This is the
sequence of symbolic heaps computed by the analysis on its way to the error. This
counter-example covers the case where the list contains just one node. The error results
from over-abstraction, which has erased the information that this node contains the
value 0 (this can be seen in the last non-error state, t13).
Refine begins by finding a resource or pure assumption sufficient to avoid the ter-
minal error in the counter-example. Let (n0, ∆0) . . . (nk,>) be an abstract counter-
example with cmd(nk−1, nk) = {Pk} ck {Qk}. Since JckK(∆k−1) = >, ∆k−1 misses
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some assumption required to satisfy Pk. To find this, Refine solves the following ab-
duction query (line 6)—here ∆k−1 is a rearrangement of ∆k−1, for example to expose
particular memory cells:
∆k−1 ∗ [∆A] ` Pk ∗ true.
The resulting symbolic heap ∆A expresses resources or assumptions that, in combi-
nation with ∆k−1, suffice to guarantee successful execution of ck. If ∆A is false then
∆k−1 ∗ [∆A] is inconsistent; if this happens then the analysis will have to find a refine-
ment under which (nk−1, ∆k−1) can be proved to be unreachable.
Letting ∆′k−1 := ∆k−1 ∗ ∆A, Refine computes a sufficient resource for the pre-
ceding state (line 11):
∆′k−2 := Jcmd(nk−2, nk−1)K←(∆′k−1).
If ∆k−2 ` ∆′k−2 then in the step from ∆k−2 to ∆k−1 a loss of precision has hap-
pened, and we use the additional information in ∆′k−1 to refine the abstraction (line
13). Otherwise, we continue pushing backwards, and generate ∆′k−3, ∆
′
k−4, etc.
Eventually, Refine either halts with ∆i ` ∆′i for some i ≥ 0, or in the last step
obtains ∆0 6` ∆′0. In the former case, Refine invokes the procedure SelectSymbols,
passing it the forward and the backward sequence of symbolic heaps leading to the error
(line 14). The symbols it generates are added to the multiset S, refining the abstraction.
In the latter case, we did not find a point for refining the abstraction, so Refine reports
a (still possibly spurious) error (line 18). Note that in this case the computed heap ∆′0
is a sufficient pre-condition to avoid this particular abstract counter-example.
If Refine calls SelectSymbols to update the abstraction, it discards the current node
and all its descendants from the ART (line 15). The ART below the refinement point
will be recomputed in subsequent iterations using (possibly) stronger invariants.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If the algorithm terminates without throwing an error, the
computed map invT is an inductive invariant not containing >.
Proof. Refinement in Alg. 1 is achieved by augmenting S with new elements selected
by SelectSymbols. Since absS  absS′ for S ⊆ S′, this is immediately sound. uunionsq
Refinement heuristic. SelectSymbols stands for some heuristic function which refines
the abstraction. It takes two sequences, pathfwd and pathbwd: the former is a path taken
by the forward analysis from the i-th node of the counter-example to the error node
(such that ∆i ` ∆′i in Alg. 2), while the latter is a path sufficient to avoid the error.
SelectSymbols tries to identify symbols present in the error-avoiding path that have
been lost in the forward, overly-abstracted path. Conceptually, SelectSymbols can be
seen as a simpler analogue of the predicate discovery heuristics [1,19] (it synthesizes
only symbolic constants rather than predicates).
The heuristic in our implementation works by examining the syntactic structure
of formulae ∆ and ∆′ for which ∆ ` ∆′ has been established. The heuristic starts
by identifying congruence classes of terms occurring in both formulae and building a
tree of equalities between program variables in each congruence class. Our separation
logic prover preserves the common syntactic parts of ∆ and ∆′ by explicitly recording
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substitutions, ensuring we can recover a mapping between common variables occurring
in both formulae. The heuristic then exhaustively traverses equalities in the congruence
classes for each term of ∆′, and checks whether equalities can be used to strengthen ∆
without making it inconsistent. Intuitively, because these equalities are mentioned in the
calculated sufficient resource, they will likely be significant for program correctness.
The variables in identified equalities are then used to strengthen the abstraction. We
found this heuristic worked well in our case studies (see §5).
Running example revisited. In §2 we saw a spurious error caused by over-abstracting
values in the list. To fix this, we augmented the domain with predicates list( , , {d}),
representing a list that has at least one node with value d. We now show the refinement
step in this domain. The backward analysis begins by solving the abduction query
(node(r, nil, d′) ∧ x = d ∧ t = nil ∧ res = 0) ∗ [∆′13] ` res = 1 ∗ [ ]
This yields ∆′13 = false as the only solution. The analysis then generates the following
sequence of symbolic heaps (we omit some for brevity). Compare with the abstract
counter example in Fig. 2; here ∆′i corresponds to node ti):
∆′12 = (t 6= nil ∧ res = 0 ∧ true)
∆′10 = ((d = x ∧ true) ∨ (t′ 6= nil ∧ res = 0 ∧ node(t, t′, d′) ∗ true))
∆′9 = ((node(t, t
′, x) ∗ true) ∨ (t′ 6= nil ∧ res = 0 ∧ node(t, t′, d′) ∗ true))
∆′8 = (((res 6= 0 ∨ t = nil) ∧ true) ∨ (node(t, t′, x) ∗ true) ∨
(t′ 6= nil ∧ res = 0 ∧ node(t, t′, d′) ∗ true))
∆′7 = ((r = nil ∧ true) ∨ (node(r, t′, x) ∗ true) ∨ (t′ 6= nil ∧ node(r, t′, d′) ∗ true))
∆′5 = (r = t
′ ∧ true)
The algorithm stops at ∆′5, since ∆5 ` ∆′5, and calls SelectSymbols to augment the
abstraction. Our implementation looks for equalities in each ∆′ that can be used to
strengthen ∆. In this case, in ∆′10 the heuristic identifies d = x to strengthen the cor-
responding ∆10 = node(r, nil, d′) ∧ t = r ∧ res = 0 ∧ d = d′. Thus the heuristic
selects the variable x to augment the abstraction’s multiset.
In the unrefined analysis, any predicate list( , , S) will be abstracted to list( , , ∅)
(equivalent to list( , )). Adding x to the multiset means that predicates of the form
list( , , {x}) will be protected from abstraction. We restart the forward analysis from
t5. This time the error is avoided, and we obtain the following abstract states:
t′6 = (l5, list(r, nil, {x})) . . .
t′9 = (l9, list(r, nil, {x}) ∧ t = r ∧ res = 0)
Executing from l9 to l10 gives two possible post-states: node(r, r′, d′) ∗ list(r′, nil, {x})∧
t = r ∧ res = 0 ∧ d = d′ and node(r, r′, x) ∗ list(r′, nil, ∅) ∧ t = r ∧ res =
0 ∧ d = x. In fact, this refined abstraction suffices to prove the absence of errors on all
paths, which completes the analysis. (Other examples may need multiple refinements)
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case S = ∅: list(e, f, ∅) , node(e, f, ) ∨ (node(e, x′, ) ∗ list(x′, f, ∅))
case S = {d}: list(e, f, {d}) , node(e, f, {d}) ∨ (node(e, x′, {d}) ∗ list(x′, f, ∅))
∨ (node(e, x′, ) ∗ list(x′, f, {d}))
case |S| > 1, d ∈ S: list(e, f, S) , node(e, x′, {d}) ∗ list(x′, f, S \ {d})∨
node(e, x′, ) ∗ list(x′, f, S)
Fig. 3. Recursive definition of the list predicate in domain SHmls.
∆ ∧ x′ = e  mlsT ∆[e/x′]
∆ ∗ σ(x′, e, )  mlsT ∆ ∗ true if x′ /∈ EVars(∆)
∆ ∗ σ1(x′, y′, ) ∗ σ2(y′, x′, )  mlsT ∆ ∗ true if x′, y′ /∈ EVars(∆)
∆ ∗ σ1(e1, x′, S1) ∗ σ2(x′, e2, S2)  mlsT ∆ ∗ list(e1, nil, prT (S1 ∪ S2, Π))
if x′ /∈ EVars(∆, e1, e2) ∧∆ ` e2 = nil(
∆ ∗ σ1(e1, x′, S1) ∗
σ2(x
′, e2, S2) ∗ σ3(e3, f, S3)
)
 mlsT
(
list(e1, e2, prT (S1 ∪ S2, Π))
∗∆ ∗ σ3(e3, f, S3)
)
if x′ /∈ EVars(∆, e1, e2, e3, f) ∧∆ ` e2 = e3
∆ ∗ list(e, f, S)  mlsT list(e, f, prT (S,Π))
Fig. 4. Abstract reduction system  mlsT defining the abstraction function absmlsT . (In the rules,
σ, σi range over {node, list}. The pure assumption Π is supplied by the analysis.)
4 Example Multiset-Parametric Analyses
We describe in detail linked lists with value refinement and sketch two other multiset
families: linked lists with address refinement, and sorted linked lists with value refine-
ment. Details for the latter two can be found in Appendix B. All three families are
experimentally evaluated in §5.
Linked lists with value refinement is domain used in our running example (§2).
List segments are instrumented with a multiset representing the lower bound on the
frequency of each variable or constant. The abstraction function is parameterised by
a multiset controlling which symbols are abstracted. By expanding the multiset, the
preserved frequency bounds are increased, and so the abstraction is refined.
The domain SHmls contains spatial predicates node(·, ·, {d}) and list(·, ·, S) for all
S and d ∈ S. Here x, y are locations, d is a data value, S is a multiset:
– node(x, y, {d}) holds if x points to a node whose next field contains y and data
field contains d, i.e., node(x, y, {d}) , x 7→ {next : y, data : d}.
– list(x, y, S) holds if x points to the first node of a non-empty list segment that ends
with y, and for each value d ∈ dom(S), there are at least S(d) nodes that store d.
The recursive definition of list in SHmls is shown in Fig. 3. We use these equivalences
as folding and unfolding rules when solving entailment queries in SHmls.
Abstraction. Let T be a finite multiset of program variables and constants. In Fig. 4,
we define a parametric reduction system  mlsT , which rewrites symbolic heaps from
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SHmls to canonical heaps whose data and multiset values are congruent to elements of
T . Except for the final rule, the relation mlsT resembles the abstraction for plain linked
lists developed by Distefano et al. [13, table 2].
The final reduction rule replaces every predicate list(e, f, S) with the bounded pred-
icate list(e, f, prT (S,Π)). The operator prT extracts the maximal subset of S such that
no element appears more frequently than it does in T (modulo given pure assumptions
Π). Let ∼Π be the equivalence relation x ∼Π y , Π ` x = y. Fix a representative for
each equivalence class of∼Π , and for a multiset S, denote by S/Π the multiset of∼Π -
representatives where the multiplicity of a representative x is
∑
x∼Πy S(y). Writing
x · n for a multiset element x occurring with multiplicity n, we define prT by
prT (S,Π) , {x·n | x·k′ ∈ S/Π ∧ ∃d′·m′ ∈ T/Π . Π ` x = d′ ∧ n = min(k′,m′)}.
As  mlsT has no infinite reduction sequences, it gives rise to an abstraction function
absmlsT by exhaustively applying the rules until none apply.
Lemma 1 (Finiteness). If T is finite and there are only finitely many program variables
then the domain CSHmlsT , {∆ | ∆ 6` false ∧ ∆ 6 mlsT } is finite.
Lemma 2 (Soundness). As ∆  mlsT ∆′ implies ∆ ` ∆′, absmlsT : SH → CSHmlsT is a
sound abstraction function.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity). If T1 ⊆ T2 then absmlsT1  absmlsT2 .
4.1 Linked Lists with Address Refinement int remove(Node x) {
... // (border cases)
p = hd; c = p->next;
while (c!=nil) {
if (c==x) {
p->next = c->next;
return 1;
}
p = c; c = p->next;
}
return 0;
}
Rather than preserving certain values in the list, we
might need to preserve nodes at particular addresses.
For example, to remove a node from a linked list we
might use the procedure shown on the right. Given
pre-condition list(r, x) ∗ node(x, n′, ) ∗ list(n′, nil)
the procedure will return 1. However, the standard
list abstraction will forget the existence of the node
pointed to by x, making this impossible to prove.
To preserve information of this kind, we combine
the domain of linked lists, SHrls, with a multiset re-
finement that preserves particular addresses. Because node addresses are unique, the
domain contains just list and node predicates, rather than predicates instrumented with
multisets. The reduction system rlsT protects addresses in the multiset T from abstrac-
tion. As before, refinement consists of adding new addresses to the multiset.
4.2 Sorted Linked Lists with Value Refinement
We can apply the idea of value refinement to different basic domains, allowing us to deal
with examples where different data-structure invariants are needed. In our third analysis
family, we refine on the existence of particular values in a sorted list interval, rather
than a simple segment. The domain SHsls contains the predicate list≤, parameterised
by an interval of the form [α, β〉, which stores the bounds of the values in the list, and
a multiset S, which bounds on the frequency of particular values in the interval. The
abstraction function  slsT works in a similar way to SHmls: the operator prT caps the
frequency set S, limiting the number of values that are preserved by abstraction.
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No Benchmark Result Dom |T | #Refn |ART| #Quer
Set
1 add(x)–∗–mem(x) X SHmls 1 1 83 162
2 ∗–add(x)–∗¬del–mem(x) X SHmls 1 1 104 193
3 ∗¬del–mem(x)–∗¬x–mem(x) X SHmls 1 1 165 280
4 ∗add(x)–all equal to x ∞ SHmls
5 ∗add(x)–all sorted > SHmls
Multiset
6 add(x)–add(x)–del(x)–mem(x) X SHmls 2 1 67 91
7 ∗–add(x)–∗¬del–mem(x) X SHmls 1 1 112 205
8 ∗¬del–mem(x)–∗¬x–mem(x) X SHmls 1 1 171 312
9 ∗–add(x)–∗¬del–add(x)–∗¬del–del(x)–mem(x) X SHmls 2 2 219 458
Map
10 ∗–put(k, v)–∗¬k–get(k) X SHmls 1 1 118 215
11 ∗–rem(k)–bound(k) X SHmls 1 1 92 168
ByteBufferPool
12 Property 1 X SHrls 1 1 154 231
13 Property 2 X SHrls 2 (1) 1 189 270
14 Property 3 X SHrls 6 (2) 4 316 511
FreeRTOS list
15 Property 4 X SHmls 1 1 91 158
16 Property 5 X SHsls 6 5 425 971
Table 1. Experimental Results. Benchmarks verified by the analysis are marked with X, those
where it threw an error with > and those where it did not terminate with∞. Dom is the domain
used for the analysis, |T | is the size of the multiset T after the final refinement (number in paren-
theses denotes the size of the minimal sufficient T ), #Refn is the no. of refinement steps, |ART|
the no. symbolic states in the final ART, and #Quer the no. queries sent to the prover.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented Algorithm 1 and abstract domains SHmls, SHrls and SHsls in the sepa-
ration logic tool coreStar [6]. Aside from superficial tweaks, we used an identical algo-
rithm and SelectSymbols heuristic for all of our case studies. We used client-oriented
specifications [18] describing datastructures from Redis (a key-value store), Azureus (a
BitTorrent client) and FreeRTOS (real time operating system). Table 1 shows results.
Set, Multiset and Map. These are synthetic benchmarks based on specifications for
Redis [18]. They check various aspects of functional correctness—for example, that
following deletion a key is no longer bound in the store. Furthermore, we check these
specifications across dynamic updates which may modify the data structures involved—
for example, by removing duplicate bindings to optimize for space usage.
The Set and Multiset benchmarks apply operations add (add an element), del (delete
an element) and mem (test for membership) to a list-based set (multiset, respectively) in
the order indicated by the benchmark name. The symbols ∗, ∗¬del and ∗¬x respectively
denote applying all operations any number of times with any argument, all operations
except del, and all operations but excluding x as an argument. For Map benchmarks
the operations put (insert a key-value pair), get (retrieve a value for the given key),
rem (remove a key with the associated value) and bound (check if the key is bound)
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are to a list-based map. For benchmarks 1,2,6,7,9,10 the goal was to prove that the last
operation returns true; for benchmark 11 that it returns false; and, for benchmarks 3
and 8 that the two mem operations return the same value. Benchmark 4 illustrates a
universal property that causes our analysis in SHmls to loop forever by adding x to T
at each refinement step. Benchmark 5 is a universal property for which our analysis in
SHmls fails to find an inductive invariant due to the ordering predicate (using SHsls on
the same benchmark loops forever).
ByteBufferPool. Azureus uses a pool of ByteBuffer objects to store results of network
transfers. In early versions, free buffers in this pool were identified by setting the buffer
position to a sentinel value. The ByteBufferPool benchmarks check properties of this
pool. Property 1 checks that if the pool is full and a buffer is freed, that just-freed
buffer is returned the next time a buffer is requested. Property 2 checks that if the pool
has some number of free buffers, then no new buffers are allocated when a buffer is
requested. Property 3 checks that if the pool has at least two free buffers, then two
buffer requests can be serviced without allocating new buffers.
FreeRTOS list. This is a sorted cyclic list with a sentinel node, used task management
in the scheduler. The value of the sentinel marks the end of the list—for instance, on
task insertion the list is traversed to find the right insertion point and the guard for that
iteration is the sentinel value. To check correctness of the shape after insertion (Property
4) it suffices to remember that the sentinel value is in the list. To check that tasks are
also correctly sorted according to priorities (Property 5) we need to keep track of list
sortedness and all possible priorities as splitting points.
6 Conclusions and Limitations
We have presented a CEGAR-like abstraction refinement scheme for separation logic
analyses, aimed at refining existential properties of programs, in which we want to track
some elements of a data structure more precisely than others.
Our prototype tool is built on coreStar [6], and we expect our approach would com-
bine well with other separation logic tools, e.g. [7,3]. In particular, abduction is known
to work well in an inter-procedural setting [7] and we thus believe our approach could
be made inter-procedural without substantial further research.
Minimizing incompleteness is more challenging, as without further assumptions Al-
gorithm 1 might diverge, or fail to recognize a spurious counter-example as infeasible.
If the forward transfer function is exact (i.e., returns the strongest post-condition) and
the backward transfer function is precise (i.e., for any c and ∆, JcK(JcK←(∆)) ` ∆)
then the algorithm makes progress relative to the refinement heuristic. Intuitively, if
SelectSymbols always picks a symbol such that the refined abstraction rules out the
spurious counter-example, then that counter-example will never reappear in subsequent
iterations. However, we are skeptical that our current heuristic satisfies this condition.
For a more formal discussion, see Appendix A.
Note that Berdine et al. [4] similarly do not establish progress for their analysis.
Predicate abstraction techniques that do not a priori fix the set of predicates have the
same issue, as do interpolation-based procedures that do not constrain the language of
acceptable interpolants. In both cases, the restrictions that ensure termination also limit
the set of programs that can be proved correct.
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A Relative Progress and Completeness
Without further assumptions, the abstraction refinement algorithm might diverge, or re-
port a spurious counter-example which is in fact not feasible. The following idealised
assumptions suffice to ensure progress and completeness (we are skeptical that condi-
tion (c) holds for our current realisation of the analysis—see below).
(a) The forward transfer function is exact (i.e., J·K-image is the strongest post-condition
in the given abstract domain).
(b) The backward transfer function is precise (so we are able to identify spurious
counter-examples). Formally, for any c and ∆, we have JcK(JcK←(∆)) ` ∆.
(c) When called with a (pathfwd, pathbwd)-pair of the counter-example and the path
sufficient to avoid the error, the procedure call SelectSymbols(pathfwd, pathbwd)
picks symbols A for augmenting S such that the spurious counter-example ending
with pathfwd is eliminated by the abstraction absS∪A.
Alg. 1 then makes progress by ensuring that a counter-example, once eliminated, re-
mains eliminated in all subsequent iterations.
Theorem 2 (Relative progress). Let γj be the counter-example processed in the j-th
refinement step. Then for all j ≥ 1, |γj | ≤ |γj+1|, where | · | denotes the length of the
counter-example. In addition, if γj is processed with value k in the while-loop on line 2
of Alg. 1 then the program being analysed has no counter-examples of length less than
k.
Proof. Let S(j) denote the multiset from the j-th iteration of Refine. Since absS(j) 
absS(j+1), no new counter-examples can appear in the part of the ART that is recom-
puted in the (j+1)-th step (invariants computed in CSHS(j+1) will be at least as strong
as those in CSHS(j)). Since (c) guarantees that the previous counter-example has been
eliminated, if a new counter-example is found then the corresponding value of k in the
while-loop will be either the same as in the j-th step or larger. uunionsq
Theorem 3 (Relative completeness). If the safety property is implied by an induc-
tive invariant expressible in CSHS for some finite multiset S and assuming that those
elements would eventually be selected from counter-examples by SelectSymbols then
Alg. 1 terminates without throwing an error.
Proof. Since Alg. 1 proceeds in a breadth-first fashion and counter-examples to safety
properties are finite, all counter-examples leading to picking elements of S will eventu-
ally be processed, enabling Alg. 1 to compute an invariant in CSHS′ for some S′ ⊇ S.
uunionsq
Assumptions (a) and (b) can be satisfied (although for implementation efficiency we
may choose not to). Assumption (c) is more problematic.
Forward transfer. Without exactness, a spurious counter-example may never be elimi-
nated, because our analysis refines only the abstraction function. Since separation logic
analyses effectively calculate strongest post-conditions,5 we in fact have exact forward
transfer, meaning spurious counter-examples can always be eliminated.
5 modulo deallocation—although even for that case the forward transfer is tight in actual imple-
mentations.
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Backward transfer. In our analysis abduction is performed on finite unfoldings of predi-
cates, modulo an arbitrary frame, fixed along the counter-example. As a result, counter-
examples are always expressed as data-structures of a particular size (rather than e.g.
general lists which could be of any size). This means that counter-examples can be ex-
pressed in the points-to fragment of separation logic, in which optimal solutions are
possible [7]. Thus in principle we can satisfy (b) and make backward transfer precise.
However, such a complete abductive inference is of exponential complexity since it
has to consider all aliasing possibilities. In our implementation, we use a polynomial
heuristic algorithm (similar to [7]) which may miss some solutions, but in practice has
roughly the same cost as frame inference.
Selecting symbols. Due to its heuristic nature, it is unlikely that our implementation
of SelectSymbols satisfies assumption (c). Furthermore, we are unsure whether it is
generally possible to construct SelectSymbols that would satisfy (c) for an arbitrary
parametric domain. While at least in principle we could employ a trivial heuristic which
enumerates all multisets of symbols, that would be impractical. The problem of picking
symbols which are certain to eliminate a particular counter-example seems uncomfort-
ably close to selecting predicates for predicate abstraction sufficient to prove a given
property. Many effective heuristics used in this area are incomplete (in that they may
fail to find an adequate set of predicates when one exists), and there has been only a
limited progress in characterising complete methods.6 Unfortunately, all such complete
predicate refinement methods rely on interpolation, a luxury which we do not (yet) have
in separation logic. More work is needed to understand the intrinsic complexity of ways
for doing refinement in separation logic analyses such as the one proposed in this paper
in relation to the logical properties of separation logic domains.
B Details of Other Multiset-Parametric Domains
Here we give detailed definitions of the two analysis families that we sketched in §4.
B.1 Linked Lists with Address Refinement
This analysis allows refinement on protecting particular addresses, rather than values.
We work with the domain of linked lists, which we denote SHrls, built from plain spatial
predicates node and list.
Our abstraction works similarly to the abstraction for plain linked lists [13] except
that it can be refined to preserve nodes at particular addresses. Fig. 5 shows rewrite
rules realising the abstraction absrlsT . The rules are guarded by a finite set of terms T
representing locations—each rule is enabled only if the spatial object triggering the
rule is not among the locations in T .
Lemma 4. CSHrlsT , {∆ | ∆ 6` false ∧ ∆ 6 rlsT } is finite and absrlsT : SH→ CSHrlsT is a
sound abstraction.
6 See Ranjit Jhala, Kenneth L. McMillan. A Practical and Complete Approach to Predicate
Refinement. In TACAS, 2006, for an instance of such complete predicate refinement method
(for difference bound arithmetic over the rationals).
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∆ ∗ σ1(e1, x′) ∗ σ2(x′, e2)  rlsT ∆ ∗ list(e1, nil)
if x′ /∈ EVars(∆, e1, e2) ∧∆ ` e2 = nil ∧ ∀t ∈ T .∆ 0 e1 = t
∆ ∗ σ1(e1, x′) ∗ σ2(x′, e2) ∗ σ3(e3, f)  rlsT ∆ ∗ list(e1, e2) ∗ σ3(e3, f)
if x′ /∈ EVars(∆, e1, e2, e3, f) ∧∆ ` e2 = e3 ∧ ∀t ∈ T .∆ 0 e1 = t
Fig. 5. Abstract reduction system  rlsT defining the abstraction function absrlsT . First three rules
(not shown) are the same as in Fig. 4. In the shown rules, σ, σi range over {node, list} and the
data field is elided.
S = ∅:
list≤(e, f, [α, β〉, ∅) , α ≤ d′ < β ∧ (node(e, f, {d′})∨
node(e, x′, d′) ∗ list≤(x′, f, [d′, β〉, ∅))
S = {d}:
list≤(e, f, [α, β〉, {d}) , node(e, f, {d})∨
d = α ∧ node(e, x′, {d}) ∗ list≤(x′, f, [d, β〉, ∅)∨
d 6= α ∧ α ≤ d′ < β ∧ node(e, x′, d′) ∗ list≤(x′, f, [d′, β〉, {d})
|S| > 1, d ∈ S:
list≤(e, f, [α, β〉, S) , d = α ∧ node(e, x′, {d}) ∗ list≤(x′, f, [d, β〉, S \ {d})∨
d 6= α ∧ α ≤ d′ < β ∧ node(e, x′, d′) ∗ list≤(x′, f, [d′, β〉, S)
Fig. 6. Recursive definition of the list≤ predicate in domain SHsls.
Lemma 5. If T1 ⊆ T2 then absrlsT1  absrlsT2 .
B.2 Sorted Linked Lists with Value Refinement
Lastly, we present an analysis that works in the domain of sorted linked lists. Our ab-
straction can be refined to preserve particular values in the list, as with the analysis
described in §4. However, the domain consists of ordered lists segments.
Domain. The predicate list≤(x, y, [α, β〉, S) holds if x points to a sorted non-empty
list segment ending with y whose data values are all greater than or equal to α and less
than β, and for each d ∈ dom(S), there are at least S(d) nodes in the list with value d.
Parameters α, β and S satisfy the invariant I : ∀d ∈ dom(S) . α ≤ d < β. Sorted lists
can be split according to the following rule:
list≤(e, f, [α, β〉, S) = list≤(e, x′, [α, γ〉, S ∩ [α, γ〉) ∗ list≤(x′, f, [γ, β〉, S ∩ [γ, β〉).
Folding/unfolding rules for exposing/hiding are similar to the rules for list (Fig. 3), but
in addition keep track of the involved inequalities. New rules for list≤ are shown in
Fig. 6. Note that each rule maintains the invariant I .
Abstraction. In the abstraction, we proceed similarly as in Fig. 4 but also maintain the
invariant I . Fig. 7 shows rewrite rules corresponding to the fourth rule of Fig. 4 for
σ1 = σ2 = node and σ1 = σ2 = list≤. The rest of the cases for σi are analogous to
the fourth rule, and the fifth rule of Fig. 4. The resulting abstraction absslsT satisfies the
following lemmas:
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∆ ∗ node(e1, x′, {d1}) ∗ node(x′, e2, {d2})  slsT
∆ ∗ list≤(e1, nil, [d1, d2 + 1〉, prT ({d1, d2}, Π))
if x′ /∈ EVars(∆, e1, e2) ∧∆ ` e2 = nil
∆ ∗ list≤(e1, x′, [α1, β1〉, S1) ∗ list≤(x′, e2, [α2, β2〉, S2)  slsT
∆ ∗ list≤(e1, nil, [α1, β2〉, prT (S1 ∪ S2, Π))
if x′ /∈ EVars(∆, e1, e2) ∧∆ ` e2 = nil ∧ β1 ≤ α2
Fig. 7. Selected rules of the abstract reduction system slsT defining the abstraction function absslsT .
Lemma 6. For CSHrssT , {∆ | ∆ 6` false ∧ ∆ 6 slsT }, absslsT : SH→ CSHrlsT is a sound
abstraction. If the domain of values is finite then CSHrssT is also finite.
Lemma 7. If T1 ⊆ T2 then absslsT1  absslsT2 .
For infinite value domains, the set CSHrssT is infinite since we have infinite ascending
chains of intervals as parameters to list≤. We could recover convergence in such cases
by using widening on the interval domain [12].
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